When using cryptographic hashing, what does the attacker look for in pre-computed tables?

In the context of cryptographic hashing, an attacker utilizing pre-computed tables, often referred to as rainbow tables, is specifically searching for a matching password hash. These tables are generated from a comprehensive list of possible passwords and their corresponding hashes. When an attacker has access to a hashed password (for example, from a database), they can compare this hash against the entries in the rainbow table. If they find a match, they can easily determine the original password that generated that hash.

This method underscores the importance of using strong, unique passwords along with techniques such as salting, which adds an additional string to the password before hashing to significantly increase the complexity and size of the hash output, making pre-computed tables much less effective. By contrasting this with other aspects included in the question: usernames, encryption keys, and hashing algorithms do not provide the same direct avenue for cracking password hashes as searching for a matching hash does.

Therefore, the focus on the hash means that if the attacker can locate the exact hash of a stored password within these pre-computed tables, they can compromise user accounts by gaining access to the original passwords.